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YELLOWBEAR V. LAMPERT— PUTTING TEETH INTO 
THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED 




The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
(RLUIPA) provides prisoners with a means to challenge prison policies that 
impede their right to freely exercise their religion. Although the RLUIPA 
provides a means by which to challenge restrictive prison policies, 
prisoners seeking to establish a claim under the RLUIPA often face an 
uphill battle. The difficulties a prisoner faces when bringing a RLUIPA 
claim compound when that prisoner belongs to a religion that is not widely 
practiced in the United States.
1
 This note analyzes the implications that 
Yellowbear v. Lampert has on the manner in which Native American 
prisoners’ rights will be viewed and adjudicated going forward.
2
 
Andrew J. Yellowbear is a member of the Northern Arapaho tribe. He is 
also a prisoner of the Wyoming Department of Corrections. While serving 
his sentence, Yellowbear finds solace in the traditional religion of his 
ancestors. Central to Yellowbear’s religious beliefs is the sweat lodge 
ceremony.
3
 Through the use of a sweat lodge, Yellowbear seeks to purify 
his mind, spirit, and body in the same manner that his ancestors have since 
time immemorial.
4
 Yellowbear, however, was denied his right to exercise 
this aspect of his religion by the Wyoming Corrections Department.
5
 This 
deprivation prompted him to file a claim against the Corrections 
                                                                                                                 
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 54 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 2. 741 F.3d 48. 
 3. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CPD T5360.01, INMATE RELIGIOUS 
BELIEFS AND PRACTICES at Native American, 1 (Mar. 27, 2002), http://www.acfsa.org/ 
documents/dietsReligious/FederalGuidelinesInmateReligiousBeliefsandPractices032702.pdf 
[hereinafter INMATE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES] (“Sweat lodge ceremonies are 
generally conducted on a weekly basis in a correctional setting. If the Native American 
population is rather large, two separate sweat lodge ceremonies may be conducted on a 
weekly basis to accommodate all participants.”). 
 4. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 56.  
 5. Id. at 52. 
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Department under the RLUIPA, seeking to gain limited access to a sweat 
lodge that already exists within the prison walls.
6
  
This note takes the position that Yellowbear v. Lampert has favorable 
implications for Native American prisoners who wish to bring a claim 
under the RLUIPA. These favorable implications consist primarily of 
making courts assess the burdens under the RLUIPA that the government 
and the claimant must meet, at the same level of generality. Part I will 
examine the portions of the RLUIPA that pertain to institutionalized 
persons, with a focus on the burdens that a claimant must meet to establish 
a prima facie claim, and the burdens that the government must overcome to 
defeat that claim. Part II will contain a statement of the case. Part III will 
briefly summarize the decision of the case. Finally, Part IV will provide an 
analysis of the arguments utilized by the court in reaching its decision. Part 
IV will also emphasize the positive implications that Yellowbear represents 
for Native American religious practitioners bringing a claim under the 
RLUIPA.  
I. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
7
 is a 
landmark piece of legislation as evidenced by its far reaching support. By 
passing the RLUIPA, Congress provides citizens with the means to 
challenge governmental policies that substantially burden their right to 
freely exercise their religion, as well as the means to challenge 
governmental actions that affect the use of land that is religiously 
significant to a particular group.
8
 As such, the RLUIPA is based on the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
9
 The 
RLUIPA was passed by a unanimous Congress.
10
 Such bipartisan support is 
very rare, and evidences the importance that the RLUIPA embodies. Both 
political parties agreed that it is vitally important to protect our religious 
freedom to the utmost extent. Further evidence that the RLUIPA constitutes 
a significant statute is the fact that it was upheld in a unanimous Supreme 




                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. 
 7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2012).  
 8. See generally id.  
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 10. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 53 (10th Cir. 2014).  
 11. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 (2005). 
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This note will focus on the portions of the RLUIPA pertaining to the 
religious freedom of institutionalized persons.
12
 According to the relevant 
portion of the RLUIPA:  
 No government shall impose a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an 
institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the 
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that 
person— 
 (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and 




This portion of the RLUIPA is best understood in terms of the burdens that 
a claimant must meet in order to establish a claim, and the burdens that the 
government must overcome in order to defeat that claim.  
A. The Claimant’s Burdens Under the RLUIPA 
As Judge Gorsuch (now Justice Gorsuch) noted in Yellowbear, the 
RLUIPA is a statute “capable of mowing down inconsistent laws, but to 
win its application takes no small effort.”
14
 The burdens that a claimant 
must meet under the RLUIPA are twofold. First, a claimant must establish 
that the prison policy being challenged burdens a religious exercise.
15
 
Second, the claimant must establish that the prison policy constitutes a 
substantial burden on that religious exercise.
16
  
Regarding the first burden, the RLUIPA does not protect against every 
governmental action that intrudes upon a prisoner’s acts of “philosophical 
conviction” or “personal conscience.”
17
 Rather, it protects only actions 
motivated by religious beliefs. Important to the question of what constitutes 
a religious exercise, is the concept of sincerity.  
The sincerity component of the “religiosity” requirement of the RLUIPA 
is quite often dispositive of the overall success of the claim. The sincerity 
                                                                                                                 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 53. 
 15. Id. 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). 
 17. Id.  
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requirement is intended to weed out those claimants who wish to receive 
some special treatment under the guise of religious beliefs. The 
determination of what is a sincere religious belief, however, is limited by 
the non-religious role of the court with the acknowledgment that judicial 
officers are not well trained in deciding what is a sincere religious belief 
verses one that is insincere.
18
  
The difficulty in determining what is a sincere religious belief is 
compounded when the court is asked to rule on the sincerity of a belief that 
is part of a religious tradition that is not widely understood—for example, 
Native American religious traditions.
19
 To reduce the problems inherent in 
determining sincerity, the court essentially asks whether the claimant is 
attempting to perpetrate fraud on the court.
20
 This determination is similar 
to the credibility assessments that courts frequently make. 
Upon a showing of sincerity, a claimant under the RLUIPA must also 
show that the governmental policy in question burdens the exercise of their 
religious beliefs.
21
 As the Supreme Court noted in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, “the ‘exercise of 
religion’ often involves not only belief and profession but the performance 
of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship 
service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, 
[and/or] abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation.”
22
 
Thus, the claimant must show that the governmental policy challenged goes 
beyond merely infringing upon their beliefs to the point of infringing upon 
the exercise of their religion.  
A claimant under the RLUIPA does not need to show that the religious 
exercise being infringed is a “central,” a “fundamental,” or a “compelled” 
tenant of that religion.
23
 When passing the RLUIPA, Congress seemingly 
determined that it would run the risks of too many mistakes to require the 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Id. at 54. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. (“When inquiring into a claimant's sincerity, then, our task is instead a more 
modest one, limited to asking whether the claimant is (in essence) seeking to perpetrate a 
fraud on the court—whether he actually holds the beliefs he claims to hold—a 
comparatively familiar task for secular courts that are regularly called on to make credibility 
assessments—and an important task, too, for ensuring the integrity of any judicial 
proceeding.”). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012).  
 22. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990), 
overturned due to statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
4 (2012). 
 23. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 54. 
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courts to parse what is a central tenant of a religious tradition.
24
 Thus, even 
if the religious exercise in question is not considered by all adherents of a 




As stated, the second burden that a claimant must meet is that the prison 
policy in question substantially burdens that religious exercise.
26
 The 
analysis of whether a prison policy substantially burdens a religious 
exercise is distinct from the religious exercise analysis itself. Under this 
requirement, a claimant must plead enough facts to allow a reasonable trier 
of fact to conclude the truth of these claims in order to sustain a prima facie 
case under the RLUIPA. It is important to note that this is not an inquiry 
into the merit or importance of the claimant’s beliefs. Rather, “the inquiry 
focuses only on the coercive impact of the government's actions.”
27
 
The Tenth Circuit has noted that a state’s policy rises to the level of 
being substantial when: 
[T]he government (1) requires the plaintiff to participate in an 
activity prohibited by a sincerely held religious belief, (2) 
prevents the plaintiff from participating in an activity motivated 
by a sincerely held religious belief, or (3) places considerable 
pressure on the plaintiff to violate a sincerely held religious 
belief—for example, by presenting an illusory or Hobson's 
choice where the only realistically possible course of action 
available to the plaintiff trenches on sincere religious exercise.
28
 
It is worth noting that for a burden to be substantial, it does not need to 
be a complete or total denial of that religious exercise. Upon a showing of 
these two burdens, a claimant has established a prima facie claim under the 
RLUIPA.  
B. The Government’s Burdens Under the RLUIPA 
Once a claimant has established a prima facie case under the RLUIPA, 
the government must also meet two burdens in order to overcome that 
claim. First, the prison policy being challenged must be “in furtherance of a 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). 
 25. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 55. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). 
 27. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 55. 
 28. Id. (citing Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 2010)). 
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 Second, the prison policy must be “the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.”
30
 
The Supreme Court has thus far declined to give a bright line definition 
of what constitutes a compelling interest in the context of a RLUIPA claim. 
The interests asserted by prison officials are almost always staff and inmate 
safety and security, as well as the avoidance of costs.
31
 These two interests 
are related in that a prison generally must spend more money in order to 
increase the level of security within the prison. Typically, courts will find 
prison security to be a compelling interest, and there also seems to be a 
trend toward accepting the avoidance of cost as a compelling interest.
32
  
At the outset of the compelling interest analysis, it is important to note 
that while the language of the RLUIPA is identical to a traditional 
formulation of the strict scrutiny level of review, this portion of the 
RLUIPA takes on a somewhat different character given that such claims 
arise in the unique context of a prison.
33
 In the leading Supreme Court case 
for the portions of the RLUIPA pertaining to prisons, the Court heavily 
emphasized that “context matters.”
34
 The interests that guide governmental 
decision making in the context of a prison are much different than those 
interests that guide such decision making in society as a whole. For 
example, security for both the inmates and the prison staff are of vital 
importance in the context of a prison. A prison must also operate on a 
limited budget. Further, balancing the need for safety and the need to 
operate with limited resources in a prison requires experience and expertise 
that the general population lacks, judges included. Given these unique 
circumstances, courts typically provide more deference to prison officials’ 
                                                                                                                 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005); Aaron K. Block, Note, When 
Money Is Tight, Is Strict Scrutiny Loose?: Cost Sensitivity as a Compelling Governmental 
Interest Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 14 TEX. J. 
C.L. & C.R. 237, 245 (2009) (“In the prison context, both Congress and the courts consider 
inmate and staff safety and institutional security to be the most compelling governmental 
interests.”). 
 32. Block, supra note 31, at 245-46. 
 33. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 864 (2015) (“Prison officials are experts in running 
prisons and evaluating the likely effects of altering prison rules, and courts should respect 
that expertise.”). 
 34. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)). 
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Upon a showing of a compelling interest, the government must 
demonstrate that the policy is “the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling interest.”
36
 The Supreme Court has recognized that within the 
context of a prison, more deference must be given to prison officials’ 
experience and expertise.
37
 The legislative history of the RLUIPA also 
demonstrates that the sponsors of the bill were very concerned with 
providing prison officials with enough leeway to make the difficult 
decisions surrounding prison security and the allocation of resources.
38
 
Even though the language of the RLUIPA appears identical to traditional 
strict scrutiny, the burdens that the government must meet are much less 
severe than they would be under the traditional strict scrutiny test. While 
the “least restrictive means” prong of the RLUIPA test is less severe than 
traditional strict scrutiny analysis, the government still must show that it has 
refuted alternative policies suggested by the claimant.
39
 This requires prison 
officials to consider alternatives suggested by the claimant, to specifically 
refute them, and show why they are inadequate.
40
 If the government can 
meet these burdens, then the claimant’s RLUIPA claim will be defeated. 
II. Statement of the Case 
A. Facts 
Yellowbear is serving a sentence that will likely span for the remainder 
of his life.
41
 During his confinement, he has turned to his religious beliefs 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864; Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722 ("We do not read RLUIPA to 
elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution's need to maintain order 
and safety. Our decisions indicate that an accommodation must be measured so that it does 
not override other significant interests.”).  
 36. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714-15 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515-16 
(1997)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). 
 37. Id. at 717. 
 38. S. REP. 103-111, at 10 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1900 
(“Accordingly, the committee expects that the courts will continue the tradition of giving 
due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in 
establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and 
discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.”).  
 39. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 62-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. 
Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011)).  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 51. 
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for comfort. Yellowbear practices the traditional Native American religion 
of the Northern Arapaho tribe. As part of this religious tradition, 
Yellowbear requires access to a sweat lodge.
42
 In the Wyoming prison in 
which Yellowbear is incarcerated, there already exists a working sweat 
lodge that is frequently made available to Native American inmates. Prison 
officials, however, denied Yellowbear access to the sweat lodge because he 
is housed in the special protection unit of the prison.
43
 
Yellowbear is housed in the special protection unit through no fault of 
his own, but rather due to threats made against him by other inmates.
44
 
Yellowbear brought a RLUIPA claim against prison officials seeking some 
degree of access to the sweat lodge. The sweat lodge within the prison is 
located in the general population area. The prison officials claim that the 
cost of moving Yellowbear from the protective unit, where he is housed, to 
general population would be unduly burdensome because it would require a 
lock-down of certain portions of the prison.
45
  
The district court that initially heard this case decided that the prison 
policy did not violate the RLUIPA, and entered summary judgment in favor 
of the prison.
46
 Yellowbear then appealed this decision to the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Because the district court granted summary judgment, 
Yellowbear only needed to plead enough facts to show that a reasonable 
trier of fact could find in his favor. 
B. Issue 
The issue in this case can be stated in at least two ways, either from the 
perspective of the claimant, or the government. First, from the perspective 
of the claimant: whether Yellowbear has met the burdens required of a 
claimant under the RLUIPA to a sufficient degree to allow a reasonable 
trier of fact to infer the truth of the claim? Second, from the perspective of 
the government: whether the state has responded to Yellowbear’s claims to 
such a degree that no reasonable trier of fact could infer the truth of those 
claims? 
  
                                                                                                                 
 42. INMATE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES, supra note 3, at Native American, 1. 
 43. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 53.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 53, 58-59.  
 46. Id. at 53.  
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III. Decision in the Case 
The Tenth Circuit held that factual issues precluded the court from 
entering summary judgment in favor of the government.
47
 In other words, 
the court ruled that Yellowbear succeeded in establishing a prima facie 
claim under the RLUIPA, and as such, the case was remanded to the district 
court so that it could proceed to trial.
48
 The Tenth Circuit also ruled that the 
government did not establish the facts necessary to defeat Yellowbear’s 
RLUIPA claim at the summary judgment stage.
49
 Thus, the court’s ruling 
was favorable to Yellowbear. 
IV. Analysis 
As the Tenth Circuit in Yellowbear notes, the most important aspect of 
this case, and cases like it, lies in the manner in which courts typically 
weigh the substantial burden on a claimant’s exercise of religion against the 
prison officials’ asserted compelling interests.
50
 Section A will discuss the 
court’s analysis in Yellowbear of the problems associated with assessing 
each parties’ burdens under the RLUIPA with differing levels of generality. 
Section B will discuss the implications of Yellowbear for future Native 
American RLUIPA claimants, which primarily consists of requiring courts 
to assess each parties’ burdens under the RLUIPA with the same level of 
generality. 
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Analysis of Each Parties’ Burdens Under the 
RLUIPA 
In Yellowbear, the Tenth Circuit argues that one of the main problems 
for RLUIPA claims is that courts often assess the burdens that the claimant 
must meet and those that the government must meet with “different levels 
of generality.”
51
 The court assesses the burdens that must be met for the 
claimant in a very fact-intensive and specific manner, whereas the burdens 





                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. at 64. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. at 57. 
 51. Id. (citation omitted). 
 52. See id. 
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1. The Tenth Circuit’s Analysis of the Claimant’s Burdens Under the 
RLUIPA 
As discussed in Part I, in order for an inmate to establish a claim under 
the RLUIPA, they must show that a (1) religious exercise is (2) 
substantially burdened by a prison policy.
53
 In other words, an inmate must 
plead enough facts to demonstrate that a governmental policy places a 
substantial burden on a sincerely held religious exercise. The Tenth Circuit 
has clearly stated that a burden on a religious exercise rises to the level of 
being substantial when an inmate is prohibited from “participating in an 
activity motivated by a sincerely held religious belief.”
54
 
In this case, the Tenth Circuit has little difficulty in finding that 
Yellowbear met the burdens required of claimants under the RLUIPA. In 
part, this is because this case is essentially a summary judgment case, in 
which the facts must be construed in a light most favorable to Yellowbear. 
Yet, even given this procedural posture, the court was readily accepting of 
Yellowbear’s argument that the prison officials’ decision to withhold access 
to the pre-existing sweat lodge constituted a substantial burden to a 
sincerely held religious exercise. At this point in the litigation, the 
government did not dispute that the use of a sweat lodge was an important 
aspect of many Native American religions.
55
 To bolster this fact, the Tenth 
Circuit provides a number of sources that establish the centrality of the 
sweat lodge ceremony within many Native American religions.
56
 The court 
concludes that Yellowbear succeeded in pleading enough facts to allow a 
reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the use of a sweat lodge is a sincere 
religious exercise.  
The Tenth Circuit also wastes little time in deciding that a reasonable 
trier of fact could conclude that Yellowbear’s complete denial of access to a 
sweat lodge rises to the level of a substantial burden on that religious 
exercise.
57
 As the court puts it, the parties in this case contended on the 
level of absolutes: Yellowbear desired some access to a sweat lodge, and 
                                                                                                                 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012). 
 54. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 55. 
 55. Id. at 56.  
 56. INMATE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES, supra note 3, at Native American, 1; 
see JOSEPH BRUCHAC, THE NATIVE AMERICAN SWEAT LODGE: HISTORY AND LEGENDS (1993); 
ARLENE HIRSCHFELDER & PAULETTE MOLIN, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN 
RELIGIONS 287–88 (1992); Louis M. Holscher, Sweat Lodges and Headbands: An 
Introduction to the Rights of Native American Prisoners, 18 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 33 (1992). 
 57. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 56. 
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the prison officials denied him any access to a sweat lodge.
58
 The court 
easily concludes that by completely withholding, or prohibiting, 
Yellowbear’s access to a sweat lodge, the government has placed a 
substantial burden on that religious exercise.
59
 Thus having decided that 
Yellowbear had demonstrated these two burdens, thereby establishing a 
prima facie RLUIPA claim, the court turned to analyzing the burdens that 
must be demonstrated by the government in order to prevail at summary 
judgment.  
2. The Tenth Circuit’s Analysis of the Government’s Burdens Under the 
RLUIPA 
Even if a claimant has met the requisite burdens to establish a prima 
facie RLUIPA claim, the government may still prevail if it can show that 
the challenged policy is the least restrictive means of furthering a 
compelling governmental interest.
60
 In contrast to the court’s reception of 
the claimant’s burdens, the Tenth Circuit
 
is hesitant to find that the 
government has met the burdens necessary to defeat Yellowbear’s RLUIPA 
claim at summary judgment.
61
 
The compelling interests asserted by the government in this case are 
security and the avoidance of costs.
62
 This is unsurprising given that these 
are the most commonly asserted governmental interests in RLUIPA 
litigation. The Tenth Circuit proceeds to unpack these more generally 
asserted interests, and finds three potentially compelling interests. First, the 
government asserts that the use of sweat lodges is inherently dangerous, 
because it involves the use of hot coals.
63
 Second, the government asserts 
that allowing Yellowbear access to the preexisting sweat lodge would be 
unduly financially burdensome since it would require a lock-down of 
portions of the prison in order to move him to the location of the sweat 
lodge.
64
 Third, the government asserts that if it were to grant Yellowbear’s 
request it would be flooded with similar requests from other inmates.
65
 The 
court addresses each of these potential compelling interests, but finds each 
of them lacking.  
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012).  
 61. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 57. 
 62. Id. at 57-59. 
 63. Id. at 57-58. 
 64. Id. at 58-59. 
 65. Id. at 62. 
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The government begins by asserting that the prison officials have a 
compelling interest in denying Yellowbear access to the sweat lodge 
because sweat lodges in general are inherently dangerous, given that they 
require the use of hot coals.
66
 In an attempt to support this argument, the 
government cites cases from other circuit courts that were decided against 
inmates seeking access to sweat lodges on the basis of their inherent 
danger.
67
 In those cases, the courts were willing to accept, almost 
unconditionally, that security always constitutes a compelling interest in the 
context of the RLUIPA.
68
 The Tenth Circuit was unreceptive to this 
argument because, rather than plead specific facts to establish that a sweat 
lodge would be dangerous in the context of this particular case, the 
government attempted to rely upon general abstractions concerning the 
inherent dangers of allowing inmates access to a sweat lodge.
69
 The Tenth 
Circuit points out that such an argument is undercut by the fact that the 
prison in question already has an operating sweat lodge on the premises. 
The court poses the question that if the use of a sweat lodge within a prison 
is inherently dangerous to the point that it constitutes a compelling interest 
sufficient to deny an inmate access to it, then how can the prison officials 
justify the pre-existence of such a sweat lodge?
70
 The Tenth Circuit 
disapprovingly refers to this potential compelling interest as a “post-hoc 
rationalization” that is unsupported factually.
71
 Having decided that the 
broad statement that sweat lodges are inherently dangerous does not 
constitute a compelling interest, the court moves on to the next potential 
compelling interest.  
The government argues that it has a compelling interest in denying 
Yellowbear access to the sweat lodge because allowing access would 
require a lock-down of certain portions of the prison.
72
 Prison officials 
claim that a lock-down would be necessary in order to ensure that 
Yellowbear does not come into contact with other inmates who may harm 
him, and that such a lock-down would be unduly financially burdensome.
73
 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. at 57-58. 
 67. Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2008); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563 
(9th Cir. 1987). 
 68. Fowler, 534 F.3d at 939 (“A prison's interest in order and security is always 
compelling.”). 
 69. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 58. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 58-59.  
 73. Id. 
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Once again, the court takes exception to this argument because the 
government relies entirely on broad and general statements concerning cost, 
and at no point pleads any facts to suggest that the cost of such a lock-down 
would be too high.
74
 The Tenth Circuit drives home the point that RLUIPA 
claims are context specific, and as such, for prison officials to prevail at 
summary judgment, they must plead enough to show that in this particular 
context the asserted interest is compelling.
75
 Even given the substantial 
deference that is due to prison officials in RLUIPA cases, the Tenth Circuit 
states that “the deference this court must extend to the experience and 
expertise of prison administrators does not extend so far that prison officials 
may declare a compelling governmental interest by fiat.”
76
 As the court 
notes, to provide prison officials with this much deference would take 
RLUIPA adjudication out of the realm of strict scrutiny and replace it with 
no scrutiny at all.
77
 Due to the complete lack of context specificity in the 
government’s argument, the court does not find cost to be a compelling 
interest.  
In its last attempt to show a compelling interest, the government argues 
that if it accommodates Yellowbear’s request, then it will be flooded by 
similar requests from other inmates.
78
 The Tenth Circuit once again takes 
exception to the government’s reliance on such broad assertions. 
Specifically, the court criticizes the government for not providing any 
information to support the idea that there is a large number of specially 
housed inmates awaiting such an opportunity to seek a religious 
accommodation.
79
 The Tenth Circuit quotes the Supreme Court’s statement 
of disapproval of such slippery slope arguments, saying that such 
arguments “echo[] the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If 
I make an exception for you, I'll have to make one for everybody, so no 
exceptions.”
80
 The court reiterates the point that the RLUIPA is specific to 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. at 59 (“[T]he prison does not even attempt to quantify the costs it faces, let alone 
try to explain how these costs impinge on prison budgets or administration. Instead, the 
prison simply asserts, flatly and without more, that the marginal costs are ‘unduly 
burdensome.’”). 
 75. Id. at 58.  
 76. Id. at 59.  
 77. Id. at 59-60. 
 78. Id. at 62 (“As the prison puts it, Mr. Yellowbear's request ‘would be just the tip of 
the iceberg.’ And avoiding a slippery slope down to submerged troubles just out of present 
view, the prison suggests, amounts to a compelling interest all its own.”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418, 436 (2006)). 
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the context of a particular claimant. Therefore, in order for the government 
to prevail it must come forward with specific facts to support its asserted 
compelling interests. Given that the government in this case did nothing 
more than make a broad and unspecified slippery slope argument, the court 
did not find a compelling interest in the government’s claims.
81
 
B. Implications of Yellowbear for Future RLUIPA Claims Brought by 
Native Americans 
This case has positive benefits for Native American prisoners who might 
wish to bring claims under the RLUIPA in the future. These benefits 
primarily consist of requiring courts to assess the burdens of each party at 
the same level of generality. Following Yellowbear, district courts within 
the Tenth Circuit will be required to assess the government’s asserted 
compelling interests against the burden on a particular claimant’s religious 
exercise at the same level of generality. This is particularly important for 
RLUIPA claimants who practice a religion that is not widely understood in 
the United States, like Native American religions.  
The importance of requiring prison officials to back-up their asserted 
compelling interests with specific facts should not be understated. 
Particularly, given the fact that in the prison context of the RLUIPA, prison 
officials are provided much more deference than would normally be 
afforded to them under a strict scrutiny analysis. Requiring courts to 
analyze each of the parties’ burdens at the same level of generality is a 
positive step toward achieving the original purpose of the RLUIPA: to 
provide protection to inmates’ religious liberties by limiting prison 
officials’ ability to curtail those freedoms. After the Supreme Court’s 
statements concerning the heightened deference due to prison officials in 
Cutter v. Wilkinson, many district and circuit courts began to allow prison 
officials to broadly assert compelling interests, such as security and cost, 




As interpreted by many lower courts, these statements concerning 
deference to prison officials had the effect of taking the teeth out of the 
strict scrutiny language in the RLUIPA. Given the Supreme Court’s 
sanction to provide prison officials a broader degree of deference under the 
RLUIPA than a typical strict scrutiny analysis, it is more important than 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id.  
 82. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005); see, e.g., Fowler v. Crawford, 534 
F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2008); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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ever that lower courts strike the delicate balance between following the 
letter of the RLUIPA and still allowing prison officials the flexibility they 
need to keep prisons secure and within their budgetary limitations. In 
Yellowbear, Judge Gorsuch on behalf of the Tenth Circuit does a masterful 
job of striking that balance. The court in Yellowbear follows the Supreme 
Court’s mandate to provide more deference to the experience and expertise 
of prison officials, while still abiding by the plain text of the RLUIPA. 
Specifically, the Tenth Circuit repeatedly emphasizes that courts must 
assess prison officials’ asserted compelling interest in the context of the 
particular claimant.
83
 The deference required by the Supreme Court is not 
so broad as to require courts to grant summary judgment to RLUIPA 
defendants any time they claim a change in policy would result in less 
security and more cost. Instead, a court may only grant summary judgment 
to a RLUIPA defendant when they plead specific and detailed facts to 
support their asserted compelling interests. Thus, in Yellowbear, the Tenth 
Circuit provides due deference to the experience of prison officials while at 
the same time living up to the purpose of the RLUIPA.  
The implications of Yellowbear are evident in the recent Supreme Court 
case Holt v. Hobbs. While the only direct reference to Yellowbear in that 
case is found in Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor’s concurring opinion, the 
influence of Yellowbear can be seen in the Supreme Court’s repeated 
admonitions that lower courts must analyze prison official’s asserted 




Yellowbear v. Lampert is a favorable decision for Native American 
prisoners seeking to file a claim under the RLUIPA. The benefits of this 
decision rest primarily upon requiring courts to analyze the respective 
burdens of the claimant and the government at the same level of generality. 
There are certainly interesting questions pertaining to the RLUIPA left 
unanswered in Yellowbear. For example, what would be the outcome if the 
prison officials allowed Yellowbear access to a sweat lodge once a year 
when his religion requires him to use a sweat lodge monthly? Would the 
burden of Yellowbear’s religion be less substantial, and the prison officials’ 
interests more compelling? The Tenth Circuit anticipated these questions 
but did not rule on them because the parties in this case contended on the 
level of absolutes: some access to a sweat lodge, or no access to a sweat 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 57. 
 84. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867-68 (2015). 
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 In the future, however, such questions will certainly arise, and will 
likely be analyzed similarly to the questions raised in this case. 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 56.  
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